MODERN MILITARY PARACHUTE OPERATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY
Santa Ana,CA - 1 February, 2007
CATEGORY: Archives
The classic historical mission for parachute forces has been the surprise seizure of critical terrain or facilities which other forces can then exploit for wider operational success. This fundamental nature does not seem likely to change. Pakistani Special Forces conducted an airborne operation in 1965 which was an unmitigated disaster, with 22 killed and 136 captured out of 200 deployed. The Indians conducted a far more successful operation in 1971 aimed at isolating elements of the retreating Pakistani Army.
The Indonesian Army conducted an airborne operation in 1975 to secure East TImor and the Turkish also used airborne forces in Operation Attila, the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. While the US only conducted two major airborne operations in Vietnam, it is worth noting that every one of the four major US airborne operations conducted between 1983 and 2003 was aimed at securing an airfield. In fact the last major parachute operation conducted by the UK, in the 1956 Suez crisis, had exactly the same aim. It is also telling that the when the UK conducted the first major airborne exercise for the newly formed 16 Air Assault brigade, the first task of the brigade was to seize and hold an airfield. As previously mentioned, this strongly indicates, that the airborne forces are primarily suited at securing facilities or terrain for other forces to use. Thus it is axiomatic, that in order for airborne operations to succeed, you must have forces capable of exploiting their success, in a timely and effective fashion. Unfortunately, it would seem that, merely possessing airborne light infantry, parachute equipment and transport aircraft gives the owner little in the way of actual military capability.
The one possible exception to this is specialised counter-insurgency operations. The Rhodesian Army operated a parachute unit during the 1972·80 conflict. This was remarkably successful primarily because the Rhodesians lacked effective helicopter mobility both in terms of types and numbers. They were limited to a small number of Alouette lII's, until late in the war, then they received an equally small number of Bell UH· l's. C·47s carrying 16 paratroopers became the best way to rapidly move "fire forces" around the country in reaction to reports of attacks or sightings of terrorists.
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